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“In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means 
of warfare is not unlimited.”1 
“The environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life 
and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn”.2   
“International humanitarian law aims to protect the civilian population during armed 
conflict and to ensure its survival. As a result, it also seeks to protect the natural 




The natural environment is generally not accorded any primary consideration 
during armed conflict, and yet a substantial number of provisions aimed at 
protecting the environment in times of war exist under international law.4 Whereas 
                                               
1  This principle constitutes one of the foundational principles of international humanitarian law 
and is reaffirmed in Resolution XXVIII of the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent held in Vienna in 1965, in Resolution 2444 of the United Nations General 
Assembly of 1968 and in Article 35(1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
2  See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 
226 para 29. 
3  See “Environment and international humanitarian law” at http://www. icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/conduct-hostilities/environment-warfare/overview (accessed 18 November 2010). 
4  The International Law Commission defined the term “natural environment” as follows in 1991: 
“The words ‘natural environment’ should be taken broadly to cover the environment of the 
human race and where the human race develops, as well as areas the preservation of which is of 
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international humanitarian law (IHL) seeks to protect certain categories of persons5 
and regulate the means and methods of warfare (including the use of weapons and 
military tactics)6 during an armed conflict, international environmental law (IEL), 
broadly defined as the “corpus of international law relevant to environmental 
issues”,7 endeavours to establish general principles for the protection of the natural 
environment that are both applicable and enforceable at the international level. The 
fusion of IHL and IEL is thus fairly evident in the sense that both these branches of 
public international law endeavour to protect life through the protection of the 
environment during armed conflict. The adoption of international instruments and 
their subsequent reception into domestic law have created specific rules and 
principles to regulate armed conflict, including the conduct of hostilities,8 some of 
which have acquired the status of customary international law. Similarly, the 
existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control (and even areas beyond their control) respect the 
environment of other states, is now part of the rules of international law relating to 
the environment.9  
 This article will examine, both critically and comprehensively, the effectiveness of 
the various principles and rules that accord general,10 specific11 and indirect12 
protection to the natural environment during armed conflict, both generally and 
against the effects of hostilities in particular. To this end, focus will be placed on the 
national and international enforcement of certain mechanisms regulating the 
intersection between IHL and IEL, especially in so far as liability and redress for 
                                                                                                                                            
fundamental importance in protecting the environment. These words therefore cover the seas, 
the atmosphere, climate, forests and other plant cover, fauna, flora and other biological 
elements”: see GOAR 46th Session Supplement No 10 (A/46/10) 276. This article subscribes to 
the same generous understanding of the term “natural environment” within the contexts of both 
international and non-international armed conflict. 
5  These categories would include persons who do not, or who no longer, take an active part in 
hostilities, notably civilians and combatants who are sick, wounded, who have been captured or 
who have surrendered.   
6  The Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and 1907 
represent the first codification of the rules for the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict. 
7  Per Koroma J (dissenting) in Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226 para 29.   
8  These would include the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968; the Biological Weapons Convention 
of 1972; the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques of 1977; the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of 1980 and its five 
Protocols; the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 and its Protocols; and the Convention on 
Anti-Personnel Mines of 1997. 
9  See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 
226 para 30. 
10  See para 3 1 and accompanying footnotes below. 
11  See para 4 and accompanying footnotes below. 
12  See para 5 and accompanying footnotes below. 
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environmental damage caused during, or as a consequence of, armed conflict are 
concerned. 
 This focus is necessitated by the fact that, to date, the only instance of state 
liability and redress for damage caused to the environment during armed conflict 
has been the Iraq/Kuwait incident. Images of the flames and the dense clouds of 
black smoke above the blazing oil wells in the Kuwaiti desert spurred an 
international outcry. Although the United Nations Charter does not expressly 
provide for a regime of liability – either for damage caused to the natural 
environment or for the depletion of natural resources during armed conflict – its 
provisions have been used, in an indirect manner, to hold Iraq accountable for 
environmental damage.13 And yet it must be borne in mind that in this instance state 
liability and redress emanated from Iraq’s direct, blatant violation of Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter,14 and thus the jus ad bellum,15 rather than from any 
violation of the rules and principles applicable during armed conflict or the jus in 
bello.16 
 
 2 THE INHERENT DICHOTOMY: OFTEN NEGLECTED YET A “PRECIOUS 
ASSET”17 
The International Court of Justice (the ICJ)18 has made it clear that an obligation 
rests on states to take environmental considerations into account during armed 
conflict in so far as these relate to states’ military objectives.19 Thus the destruction 
                                               
13  See, in particular, United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991) 
para 16 which states that Iraq “is liable under international law for the depletion of the natural 
resources . . . as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”. Emphasis added. 
14  Art 4(2) of the United Nations Charter reads: “All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations”. 
15  The term jus ad bellum, literally translated, means the right to initiate war. International law did 
not prohibit the use of force by states until 1928 with the signing of the General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War, also known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Pact: see, in general, 
Dugard J International law: A South African Perspective 3ed (2005) 501 at 501 n 4 and 526; and 
Gill TD & Fleck D “History and Development of the International Law of Military Operations” in 
Gill TD & Fleck D (eds) The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations (2010) 11 
at 14-20. 
16  In other words, a violation of the law applicable during armed conflict: see, in general, Dinstein 
Y “Protection of the environment in international armed conflict” (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook 
of the United Nations Law 523 at 523-524 and at 548; and Gill & Fleck  (2010) at 20-21. 
17  This term is used by Gasser: see, in particular, Gasser HP “Guidelines for Military Manuals and 
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict” (1996) 78 No 
311 International Review of the Red Cross 230 at 230-237. 
18  In Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226 
para 30. 
19  See also, in general, Kalshoven F & Zegveld L Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction 
to International Humanitarian Law (2001) at 20 who, with reference to the St Petersburg 
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of an oil refinery, for example, may give rise to various environmental 
consequences, such as causing excess oil to seep into the soil and underground 
water resources, thereby causing environmental degradation on a massive scale, not 
to mention toxic air pollution.20 There appears to be general agreement that 
awareness of the severe impact of armed conflict on the environment gained 
considerable momentum subsequent to the oil slicks on the waters of the Persian 
Gulf and the intentional destruction of over 600 burning oil wells in Kuwait21 at the 
end of the first Gulf War of 1990-1991.22  
  There have been at least eighteen civil wars in the last twenty years, all spurred 
on by the desire of armed groups, especially in Liberia, Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, to control and exploit natural resources such as diamonds, 
timber, minerals and cocoa.23 Bouvier rightly points out that awareness of the 
importance for humanity of a healthy environment and the determination of various 
agencies have produced a vast number of rules for the protection and preservation 
of the natural environment at both the national and international levels.24 Concern 
for the environment and the conservation and preservation of the natural 
environment typically began at the national level and progressed to the adoption of 
legislation pertaining to various environmental concerns, such as water, air and 
forestry.25 This, in turn, resulted in states adopting constitutional provisions 
specifically relating to the protection of the natural environment.26   
                                                                                                                                            
Declaration of 1868, reiterate that “[t]he only legitimate object which states should endeavour 
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”. One method by which a 
belligerent party may seek to do this is by eliminating those objects which may be regarded as 
“military objectives” in the narrowest, most literal sense, e.g. units of the enemy armed forces 
and military installations such as fixed gun emplacements and munitions depots. All such 
objects represent legitimate military objectives. 
20  See Dinstein (2001) at 523-524. 
21  See, in particular, Schmidt MN “Humanitarian law and the environment” (2000) 28 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 265 at 268. 
22  See, in general, Marauhn T “Environmental damage in times of armed conflict – not ‘really’ a 
matter of criminal responsibility” (2000) 82 No 840 International Review of the Red Cross 1029 
at 1031. 
23  See, in particular, Mrema EM, Bruch C & Diamond J Protecting the Environment during Armed 
Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law 3ed (2009) at 19. 
24  See, in particular, Bouvier A “Protection of the natural environment in time of armed conflict” 
(1991) 73 No 285 International Review of the Red Cross 567 at 567-578 and Bouvier A “Recent 
studies on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict” (1992) 74 No 291 
International Review of the Red Cross 554 at 554-566. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. An example would be s 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which 
reads : “Everyone has the right (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that (i) prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development”.  
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 Yet, although the rules of IHL apply equally to all parties to a conflict regardless of 
who initiated the hostilities, very few provisions address issues pertaining to the 
natural environment directly. The foremost (customary) instruments in IHL, notably 
The Hague Convention IV and Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land of 1907 (the Fourth Hague Convention and Regulations)27 as well as the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949,28 predate the widespread concern about 
environmental damage generated by especially the Vietnam War and  the two Gulf 
Wars.29 Consequently, the notion of the natural environment does not appear in any 
IHL instrument until 1977. Additional Protocol I to the four Geneva Conventions is 
accordingly the first international (humanitarian law) instrument to directly 
address the dangers that modern warfare represents to the natural environment. 
 The extent to which the rules and principles of IHL relate to the protection of the 
natural environment will be considered next.   
 
3 IHL AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
The provisions of IHL relating to the protection of the environment during armed 
conflict can be divided into three distinct categories, namely: (a) general principles 
that are applicable to the protection of the environment; (b) specific provisions on 
the protection of the environment; and (c) provisions that provide indirect 
protection to the environment during armed conflict.30 Each of these categories will 
now critically be examined in turn.   
 
 
                                               
27  The Law of The Hague determines the rights and duties of belligerents in the conduct of their 
military operations and limits the choice of the means of doing harm. It thus seeks to strike a 
balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations. This body of law is 
founded on the Hague Conventions of 1899, revised in 1907. The most important of these is the 
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, to which is 
attached the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. The 
Hague Regulations, to which South Africa is a party, are generally accepted as forming part of 
customary international law: see, in particular, the judgment of the Nuremburg Military 
Tribunal (1947) 41 American Journal of International Law 172. 
28  These include the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 1949 (the First Geneva Convention), the Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea of 1949 (the Second Geneva Convention), the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949 (the Third Geneva Convention) and the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 (the Fourth 
Geneva Convention).  
29  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 10.  
30  Ibid at 11. 
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3.1 General principles of IHL applicable to the protection of the 
environment  during armed conflict  
The general principles of international law applicable in armed conflict are regarded 
as a source of law in accordance with Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.31 These 
principles are thus applicable to all states, either as a direct consequence of their 
ratification by States Parties or by virtue of the fact that these international 
instruments have acquired the status of customary law. In this context the Martens 
Clause32 is of particular significance. In due recognition of the fact that treaty law 
would be hard pressed to resolve all future challenges presented by IHL, the 
Martens Clause insisted that the conduct of hostilities were always to “be governed 
by existing principles of international [humanitarian] law”.33 According to the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the Martens Clause thus 
“broadens the range of applicable norms governing conduct during armed conflict 
beyond those that are laid out in treaty instruments”.34 It follows that the Martens 
Clause is to be regarded as one of the central principles of IHL which would extend 
protection to the natural environment during armed conflict in instances where no 
explicit provisions to this effect exist either in customary IHL or in treaty law.35  
 Other fundamental principles of IHL which relate to the protection of the 
environment during armed conflict include the principles of distinction, military 
necessity, proportionality and humanity. Although essential to both the scope and 
object of this article, much of what has been written about these four fundamental 
(and therefore general) principles of IHL are trite law, and consequently, each of 
these principles will only be considered briefly.  
                                               
31  Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ describes the sources of international law as “(a) 
international conventions (treaties), whether general or particular; (b) international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognised by 
civilized nations; and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” See also, in general, 
Strydom HA “Customary international law: The legacy of false prophets” (1994) 27 Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 276 at 276 and Roberts AE “Traditional and 
modern approaches to customary international law: A reconciliation” (2001) 95 American 
Journal of International Law 757 at 757-791. 
32  The Martens Clause is a general provision that was adopted at the first Hague Peace Conference 
in 1899 and was subsequently also inserted into the Preamble to The Hague Conventions of 
1907. For a detailed discussion of the Martens Clause and its significance, see Meron T Human 
Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection (1987) at 13. 
33  See, in particular, Kalshoven & Zegveld (2001) at 22. 
34  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 12.  
35  Ibid. These sentiments are also echoed in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I which reads: “In 
cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and 
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law 
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience”. The Preamble to Additional Protocol II expresses a similar sentiment: “In 
cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the 
principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience”. 




3.2 The principle of distinction 
The principle of distinction is regarded as one of the first to be applied during armed 
conflict: distinctions necessarily need to be drawn between combatants and 
members of the civilian population as well as between military objects and civilian 
objects.36 The principle of distinction furthermore prohibits indiscriminate attacks 
and any direct attacks against civilians.37 Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I 
expressly stipulates that attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so 
far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to   
“those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage”.38  
Given the non-military nature of environmental sites and protected areas, the 
targeting of such areas would, therefore, be contrary to the principle of distinction 
and in violation of Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I. The application of the 
principle of distinction within the context of the environment is not without 
controversy, however. UNEP is, for example, of the opinion that its application may 
encounter distinct practical difficulties. So, although the targeting of power plants 
and chemical factories may well cause severe environmental effects, such attack 
could still be sanctioned by Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I and interpreted as 
constituting a “direct contribution to ongoing military action”.39 Article 52(2) of 
Additional Protocol I furthermore creates difficulties in its interpretation, especially 
in so far as the distinction between a direct and an indirect military advantage is 
concerned,40 and thus the environment may in fact be rendered vulnerable during 





                                               
36  See, in particular, Art 48 of Additional Protocol I which reads: “In order to ensure respect of and 
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all 
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects 
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives”. Emphasis added. 
37  See Dinstein (2001) at 524-525. See also Art 57(5) of Additional Protocol I which contains an 
absolute prohibition on attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.   
38  Emphasis added. 
39  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 13. 
40  Ibid. 
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3.3 The principle of military necessity   
The principle of military necessity, first articulated in Article 14 of the Lieber Code 
of 1863, suggests that the “use of force is only justified to the extent it is necessary 
to achieve a defined military objective”,41 and thus this principle would proscribe 
conduct which have no direct and/or obvious military purpose.42 As Sassòli so aptly 
states: 
“IHL is a compromise between humanity and military necessity, a compromise 
which cannot always satisfy humanitarian agendas, but which has the immense 
advantage that it has been accepted by states as law that can be respected, even in 
war”.43 
The principle of military necessity is contained in the Fourth Hague Convention. To 
this end, Article 23(g) refers to enemy property and stipulates that it is forbidden 
“to destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by necessities of war”. This provision is of particular 
relevance to the natural environment as “enemy property” may include protected 
areas, environmental goods and high-value natural resources. These resources 
could thus be granted indirect protection through the principle of military necessity 
as articulated in Article 23(g) of the Fourth Hague Convention.  
 
3.4 The principle of proportionality 
Often misunderstood,44 the principle of proportionality requires that a distinction 
be drawn between the different ways in which it limits the use of force in armed 
conflict. The principle of proportionality is thus thought to restrict both the use of 
force by states (the jus ad bellum) and the right to choose the most appropriate 
means and methods of warfare (the jus in bello).45 According to Cannizzaro, 
proportionality has a two-fold purpose in respect of the jus ad bellum, in that it both 
identifies the instances in which the unilateral use of force by a state is permissible 
                                               
41  Ibid. 
42  See, in general, Dinstein (2001) 523 n 2.  
43  Sassòli M “The implementation of international humanitarian law: Current and inherent 
challenges” in TLH McCormack (ed) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (2009) 45 at 
50. Emphasis added. 
44  See, in general, Solis GD “Law of armed conflict’s four core principles” in GD Solis The Law of 
Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (2010) 250 at 284-283 and Bothe M, 
Bruch C, Diamond J & Jensen J “International law protecting the environment during armed 
conflict: gaps and opportunities” (2010) 92 No 879 International Review of the Red Cross 569 at 
577-578.   
45  Although clear in theory, this distinction tends to become obscured in practice: see, in general, 
Cannizzaro E “Contextualizing proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the Lebanese 
war” (2006) 88 No 864 International Review of the Red Cross 779 at 781. 
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and determines the “intensity and the magnitude of military action”.46 In the jus in 
bello, by contrast, the notion of proportionality is governed by the assumption that 
the parties to the conflict are equal in status, coupled with the related IHL principle 
which gives effect to the “respect owed by each party to the conflict to interests and 
values of a humanitarian nature”.47  
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I addresses the principle of proportionality. In 
essence, the principle of proportionality would be violated in instances where so-
called “collateral casualties or damage”48 would be deemed as “excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.49 Yet it is equally true 
that while IHL carefully articulates what would constitute a legitimate target, the 
type of weapon to be used when launching an attack on a particular military 
objective is not regulated. Article 57 of Additional Protocol I thus only mandates a 
balancing of military necessity and unnecessary suffering so that the principle of 
proportionality is satisfied.50 And, in the words of the ICJ, “[r]espect for the 
environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in 
conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality”.51 
 It could therefore be argued that, when the environment is damaged during 
armed conflict, such damage could well be seen as a “disproportionate response to a 
perceived threat”52 and thus constitute a violation of Article 57 of Additional 
Protocol I. This is certainly the opinion of UNEP in respect of the first Gulf War, in 
which environmental damage resulted from of the intentional burning of oil fields 
and the subsequent spilling of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf Sea.53  
 
3.5 The principle of humanity  
Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations articulates one of the fundamental objectives 
of IHL, namely to “mitigate the human suffering caused by war”.54 This fundamental 
objective, referred to as the principle of humanity, finds expression in the rules 
                                               
46  Ibid. See also, in general, Dinstein (2001) at 524.  
47  Ibid 785. See also, in general, Quéguiner JF “Precautions under the law governing the conduct of 
hostilities” (2006) 88 No 864 International Review of the Red Cross 793 at 814. 
48  Ibid 801. 
49  See, in particular, Article 57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I.  
50  See, in particular, Infeld DL “Precision-guided munitions demonstrated their pinpoint accuracy 
in desert storm; but is a country obliged to use precision technology to minimize collateral 
civilian injury and damage?” (1992) 26 (1) George Washington Journal of International Law and 
Economics 109 at 134-135.  
51  In Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226 
para 30. 
52  See, in particular, Mrema et al at 13.  
53  Ibid. 
54  See, in particular, Kalshoven & Zegveld (2001) at 12. See also, in general, Solis (2010) at 22.   
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which seek to protect those who do not (or who no longer)55 directly participate in 
the hostilities as well as in the various rules which regulate the means and methods 
of warfare. It follows that a party to an armed conflict cannot use prohibited 
methods of warfare against a civilian population and that the intentional 
contamination of natural and agricultural resources would constitute a violation of 
Article 23(e). Furthermore, the express reference contained in the Martens Clause to 
the “law of humanity” has led UNEP to conclude that “environmental 
considerations” (as proposed by the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(the IUCN)),56 “clearly seeks to build on the principle of humanity and the dictates of 
public conscience to protect the environment in the absence of specific treaty law”.57 
 There seems to be general agreement that international agreements pertaining to 
the environment and the rules of customary international law may continue to find 
application in times of war, but only to the degree that these are not in violation of 
the “applicable law of armed conflict”.58 Furthermore, environmental obligations 
that are binding on states which are not a party to an armed conflict, and that extend 
beyond their national jurisdiction, are not affected by the existence of armed conflict 
but, again, only “to the extent that those obligations are not inconsistent” with IHL.59 
 In cases not specifically addressed by either national or international agreements, 
the environment thus remains generally under the protection of the principles of 
custom, humanity and the dictates of public conscience, and therefore the rules of 
(international) environmental law may well continue to be applicable during an 
armed conflict.60 
 Provisions specifically aimed at protecting the environment during armed conflict 
will be considered next.   
    
 
                                               
55  See n 5 above. 
56  See, in particular, International Union for Conservation of Nature “A Martens clause for 
environmental protection” World Conservation Congress Resolution 2.97 (October 2000) 
Chapter 5.3(ii) 2. 
57  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 13. UNEP refers by way of example to the ongoing 
conflict in Darfur, Sudan, of an armed conflict that would constitute inhumane means of warfare. 
58  See, in particular, Art II(5) (“General Principles of International Law”) of the ICRC Guidelines for 
Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed 
Conflict. See also, in general, Gasser (1996) at 230-231. 
59  Examples would include neighbouring states and the High Seas, respectively. This express 
formulation and specific examples are contained in Art II(5) (“General Principles of 
International Law”) of the ICRC Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the 
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict. 
60  See, in general, Gasser HP “For better protection of the natural environment in armed conflict: A 
proposal for action” (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 637 at 638. 
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4 PROVISIONS SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
4.1 Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977 
UNEP rightly points out that the negotiations pertaining to Additional Protocol I to 
the four Geneva Conventions were the direct result of various wars of national 
liberation as well as the Vietnam War.61 Additional Protocol I thus applies to 
international armed conflicts which expressly include “fighting against colonial 
domination” and “racist regimes in the exercise of the right to self determination”.62 
The growing concern about the environment, as well as concerns over military 
tactics employed during these conflicts, led to the inclusion of two provisions in 
Additional Protocol I that explicitly address environmental damage, namely Article 
35(3) and Article 55.  
 Article 35 encapsulates the basic rules relating to the means and methods of 
warfare. Article 35(3) expressly states that  
“it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment”.  
This would include so-called “collateral damage”63 to the environment, and Reyhani 
rightly points out that Article 35(3) applies to situations in which the natural 
environment is damaged through the intentional use of methods or means of 
warfare and where such consequences are foreseeable.64 Article 55, in turn, provides 
specific protection for the environment within the context of the general protection 
granted to civilian objects, and thus any attacks against the natural environment by 
way of reprisals are prohibited.65 In particular, Article 55(1) states that 
“[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of 
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such 
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the 
population.” 
The common principles enshrined in Article 35(3) and Article 55 thus relate to the 
prohibition of warfare that may cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment.66 According to UNEP, the scope of these provisions 
                                               
61  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 11. See also , in particular, the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 
1976, signed in Geneva on 18 May 1977, which entered into force on 5 October 1978. 
62  See, in particular, Art 1(4) of Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
63  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 11. 
64  See Reyhani R “The protection of the environment during armed conflict” (2007) 14 No 2 
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 323 at 329. 
65  See, in particular, Bouvier (1991) at 567-578. 
66  While there is some similarity in their formulation, Art 35(3) and Art 55(1) of Additional 
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initially appears to be extensive. Yet Article 35 neither defines the term “natural 
environment” nor the terms “widespread”, “long-term” and “severe damage”.  The 
precise meaning of these terms in Article 35(3) is crucial as they establish a three-
fold threshold which must be crossed simultaneously to establish liability under 
international law. There would, for example, be no liability where damage to the 
environment during armed conflict is widespread, but not severe or long-term. The 
liability regime which Article 35(3) seeks to establish is difficult to determine, not 
only because of the lack of clarity about key definitions, but also due to the fact that 
the three thresholds are difficult to satisfy concurrently. Article 35(3) therefore 
insists on a threshold that is not only high and uncertain, but also of an imprecise 
nature. 
 It would appear that Article 55 must be interpreted as a “governing principle”67 
that requires that the effects (or consequences) of permitted actions68 may not 
result in escalating damage or produce the expressly prohibited widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment. As a governing principle, 
Article 55 thus extends beyond Article 35 in so far as it relates to issues of health or 
survival of the civilian population. This is to be welcomed, as Article 55 could then 
possibly be interpreted to also provide for instances where environmental damage 
is not only caused directly by combatants (or as a consequence of their actions), but 
also by the actions of civilians and refugees. Such situations may, for example, arise 
in an armed conflict where civilians or refugees resort to the destruction of wildlife, 
as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo.69 
 Similarly, Article 35(3) would appear not to impose any significant limitation on 
combatants waging conventional warfare. Article 35(3) thus seems primarily 
directed to high-level decision makers and would affect such unconventional means 
                                                                                                                                            
Protocol I differ in respect of their emphasis: see, in general, Hulme K “Taking care to protect the 
environment against damage: a meaningless obligation?” (2010) 92 No 879 International Review 
of the Red Cross 675 at 676. 
67  This term is suggested by Reyhani: see Reyhani (2007) at 329. 
68  Permitted actions would exclude reprisals which are expressly excluded by Art 55(2) of 
Additional Protocol I. 
69  The Okapi Wildlife Reserve (the Reserve) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC) was 
placed on the list of World Heritage in Danger in 1998, a mere year after being granted World 
Heritage status, as a direct result of the armed conflict in the DRC in early 1997 which had led to 
the looting of facilities and equipment donated by international conservation non-governmental 
organizations, the killing of elephants, incursions by thousands of gold and coltan miners and by 
hunters and cultivators. By 2001, exploitation of the Reserve by armed militias, miners and 
hunters had decimated the animal population around all camps and the park was too dangerous 
to visit. That year the IUCN, United Nations and UNEP responded to pleas from staff and non-
governmental organisations for international pressure to stop the destruction and help to 
restore funds, morale and order: see http://www.eoearth.org/article/Okapi_ 
Faunal_Reserve,_Democratic_Republic_of_Congo (accessed 3 February 2011). 
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of warfare as the use of herbicides and chemical agents which may well produce 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.70  
 Articles 35 and 55 are, of course, binding on all States Parties to Additional 
Protocol I. Yet Additional Protocol I has still to achieve universal ratification, a fact 
which has the potential to severely detract from the effectiveness of its liability 
regime. Several recent international armed conflicts which have caused massive 
destruction to the environment have been waged by non-State Parties to Additional 
Protocol I, notably the United States, Iraq and the United Kingdom.71 And even in 
instances where Additional Protocol I has been ratified, it has been subjected to 
declarations and reservations intended to limit state liability. Some states have, for 
instance, maintained that the rules of Additional Protocol I would not apply to 
nuclear weapons but to conventional weapons only.72 
 Reyhani points out that it is unclear whether Articles 35 and 55 could be 
considered to be part of customary international (humanitarian) law. There exists 
some evidence, however, to suggest that these provisions have indeed acquired the 
status of customary international law. The fact that the cause of damage to the 
environment has been expressly prohibited in many state military manuals,73 
coupled with the fact that any transgression of these provisions has been legislated 
as an offence under domestic law, may well underscore such an argument.74  
Submissions before the ICJ furthermore show that states consider Articles 35(3) and 
55 to have indeed acquired the status of customary international law.75 Any party to 
a conflict must accordingly observe these two provisions or must avoid using 
methods or means of warfare that would destroy, or could have disastrous effects 
on, the environment.76 Moreover, the prohibition of wilful serious damage to the 
environment during armed conflict could well be said to have evolved into a 
peremptory norm of international law,77 and Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the 
                                               
70  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) 10 at 11. 
71  These conflicts have included the United States coalition and Iraq (1990-1991); Iran and Iraq 
(1980-1988); and the United Kingdom and Argentina (1982): see, in general, Roberts A & Guelff 
R “International armed conflicts” in Roberts A & Guelff R (eds) Documents on the Laws of War 
3ed (2000) 419 at 421. 
72  Ibid. States such as Belgium, Canada, Germany and the United States, in particular, have 
expressed this view. 
73  These include the military manuals of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia: see, in particular, Henckaerts JM and 
Doswald-Beck L (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol I (2005) at 152 n 52.  
74  See, in particular, Reyhani (2007) at 330. 
75  See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 
226 para 31. 
76  See, in particular, Reyhani (2007) at 330 and Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck Vol I (2005) at 152. 
77  See, in particular, Uhlmann EVM “Protection of the global environment: Developing criteria for 
peremptory norms” available at http://www.heinonline.org (accessed 6 August 2010). 
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International Criminal Court (the ICC) indeed criminalises wilful damage to the 
environment during armed conflict as a war crime.78   
 The liability regime established under Additional Protocol I is, however, some 
cause for concern. Although Article 89 provides for the cooperation of States Parties 
and the United Nations to act in the case of serious violations of Additional Protocol 
I,79 and albeit that Article 90 establishes an International Fact-Finding Commission 
(the Commission) to enquire into allegations of grave breaches of Additional 
Protocol I, States Parties have to agree to accept the competence of the 
Commission.80 But since Additional Protocol I does not apply to non-international 
armed conflicts, and although the Commission has offered to extend its services to 
violations during non-international armed conflicts, it has yet to receive any request 
from a State Party to do so.81 This is indeed cause for concern, given that non-
international armed conflicts, involving non-state actors who are not parties to 
international instruments, are known to have a serious and continuing impact on 
the natural environment.82 
 Finally, the liability regime established under Additional Protocol I also appears 
inadequate as it offers no guidelines as to how, or even to whom, compensation 
should be paid. Although Article 91 provides for state responsibility in the case of 
violations and for state liability to pay compensation, “if the case demands”, for the 
actions of its armed forces,83 it cannot be determined from the provisions of 
Additional Protocol I alone whether compensation would include restitution or 
whether compensation should be in the form of a monetary award only. Similarly, 
while Article 85(4)(d) lists the destruction of “clearly-recognised historic 
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or 
spiritual heritage of peoples”, which are not military objectives, as a grave breach of 
Additional Protocol I, and Article 85(5) provides that such acts are war crimes for 
                                               
78  Art 8 of the Rome Statute prohibits “Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that 
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”. On the 
significance of this, see para 6 2. 
79  Art 89 of Additional Protocol I reads: “In situations of serious violations of the [Geneva] 
Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or 
individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations 
Charter”. 
80  Art 90(1)(b) expressly stipulates that not less than twenty High Contracting Parties have to 
agree to accept the competence of the International Fact-Finding Commission.  
81  See, in particular, Roberts & Guelff (2000) at 421. 
82  Ibid. 
83  Art 91 of Additional Protocol I reads: “A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the 
[Geneva] Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay 
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its 
armed forces”. 
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which there are to be both penal and disciplinary sanctions, there again exists no 
provision to govern compensation.84 
 The significance of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1976 (the ENMOD 
Convention) will be examined next. 
 
4.2 The ENMOD Convention   
The ENMOD Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1976 and opened for signature in 1977.85 According to UNEP the ENMOD 
Convention was created in direct response to the “military tactics employed by the 
United States during the Viet Nam War”.86 The object of the Convention is to 
prohibit the use of environmental modification techniques, defined under Article 
2,87 as a means of warfare. Article 1 of the Convention specifically requires that  
“[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or 
severe effects as a means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party”.  
Article 1(2) of the Convention also requires State Parties not to assist, encourage or 
induce any state, group of states or international organisations to engage in such 
activities.88 By virtue of Article 4, states are instructed to take measures to “prohibit 
                                               
84  Art 75 of the Rome Statute may provide a solution to the problems endemic to the liability 
regime of Additional Protocol I, at least in so far as individual perpetrators are concerned. Art 
75(1) of the Rome Statute expressly stipulates that the ICC shall “establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”. 
Art 75(2) furthermore provides that the ICC “may make an order directly against a convicted 
person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation”. Where appropriate, Art 75(2) also provides that the “award 
for reparations can be made through the Trust Fund provided for in art 79” of the Rome Statute. 
Since Art 75(6) expressly stipulates that “[n]othing in this article shall be interpreted as 
prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law”, the general principles on 
state responsibility and international law remedies in case of a violation of the provisions of 
Additional Protocol I would presumably also remain available. 
85  Signed in Geneva on 18 May 1977 and entered into force on 5 October 1978. See also, in general, 
the Sunshine Project “ENMOD: hostile environmental modification” available at 
http://www.sunshineproject.org/enmod (accessed 3 October 2010).   
86  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 12. According to UNEP, these military tactics related to 
“large-scale environmental modification techniques” which included techniques capable of 
“provoking earthquakes, tsunamis, and creating a change in weather patterns” (so-called 
“geophysical warfare”): ibid 12. Chemical defoliants which caused “extensive human suffering” 
and “long-term environmental contamination” were also used, with over 55,000 tonnes of 
chemical defoliants being targeted to forests and crops in Vietnam: ibid 12 n 10. 
87  Art 2 of the ENMOD Convention defines environmental modification techniques as “any 
technique for changing – through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes – the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere 
and atmosphere, or of outer space”. 
88  See, in general, Reyhani (2007) at 326-327. 
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and prevent” any violations. The Convention allows for complaints to be lodged with 
the United Nations Security Council (the Security Council) where a state acts in 
breach of its provisions89 and the Security Council “may” initiate investigations on 
the basis of complaints received.90 Support is to be given to any requesting state “if 
the Security Council decides that such a party has been harmed or is likely to be 
harmed as a result of the violation of the Convention”.91 
 Notable differences exist between Additional Protocol I and the ENMOD 
Convention. These relate in particular to the intended objects of and thresholds for 
environmental damage. In so far as the intended objects of the two instruments are 
concerned, Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I seeks to “protect the natural 
environment”; by contrast, the ENMOD Convention “prohibit[s] the use of 
techniques that will turn the environment into a ‘weapon’”.92 Furthermore, Article 2 
of the Convention requires that the damage has to be “widespread, long-lasting or 
severe”.93 According to UNEP, the environmental damage must be “widespread” 
where the damage encompassed “an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometres”.94 In the case of the Convention the term “long-lasting” would refer to a 
“period of months or approximately a season”,95 whereas in the case of Additional 
Protocol I, “long-term” would apparently mean “decades”.96  
 It could certainly be argued that the ENMOD Convention has been a success and 
has acted as an effective environmental instrument, as no other large scale 
environmental modification tactics have been reported subsequent to the Vietnam 
War. The Convention is also rather innovative to the extent that it prohibits 
technology which has not yet been invented,97 and marks an improvement over 
Additional Protocol I in the sense that it provides a definition for each of the three 
                                               
89  See Art 5(3) of the Convention which provides: “Any State Party to this Convention which has 
reason to believe that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the 
provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United 
Nations. Such a complaint should include all relevant information as well as all possible 
evidence supporting its validity”. 
90  See Art 5(4) of the Convention which stipulates: “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes 
to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the 
complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties of the 
results of the investigation”. 
91  See Art 5(5) of the Convention which reads: “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to 
provide or support assistance, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, to any State Party which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has 
been harmed or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the Convention”. 
92  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 12. 
93  Emphasis added. 
94  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) 10 at 12.  
95  This particular interpretation was suggested by the United Nations Committee of the 
Conference on Disarmament: see, in particular, Bothe et al (2010) at 572.   
96  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 12. 
97  See, in particular, Roberts & Guelff (2000) at 408. 
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thresholds. The Convention also lowers the standard of liability by the use of the 
word “or” in the phrase “widespread, long-lasting or severe”. This means that all 
three requirements do not have to be met before a state is deemed to be in violation 
of the prohibition. A violation of one requirement would thus be sufficient to 
establish liability. 
 Despite the marked improvements and innovative nature of the ENMOD 
Convention, it also contains some critical flaws. First, the Convention lacks a flawless 
mechanism for legal redress. For instance, the Convention allows complaints to be 
made to the Security Council but does not necessarily impose any obligation on the 
Security Council to investigate the matter. Also, since the Security Council is a highly 
political (and politicised) body, it may well choose not to investigate politically 
powerful states, including the five permanent members who possess a veto power.98 
The environmental damage caused by Iraq during the first Gulf War is a case in 
point. Although Iraq and Kuwait were not signatories to the Convention, the 
environmental damage caused by Iraq was addressed by the Security Council. Iraq 
was responsible for the spilling of seven million barrels of Kuwaiti oil into the 
Persian Gulf and had set alight more than 600 oil well heads.99 The consequences 
were catastrophic, with vast quantities of oil flowing into the Persian Gulf.  
 In terms of Resolution 687 (which set out the cease-fire conditions in the Gulf 
War), the Security Council held Iraq responsible for “any direct loss, damage, 
including environmental damage, and the depletion of natural resources” inflicted 
during the armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.100 In addition, a Compensation 
Fund (generated by revenues from Iraqi petroleum exports) and a Compensation 
Commission was established by the Security Council to administer claims against 
Iraq101 (albeit that not all delegates were of the opinion that international law 
should apply).102 The introduction of Resolution 687 by the Security Council thus 
created a foundation by which to address the consequences of future conflicts and is 
intended as a deterrent for states to become embroiled in conflict situations. 
                                               
98  Ibid. 
99  See, in particular, Schmidt MN “Humanitarian law and the environment” (2000) 28 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 265 at 268. 
100  United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991). Resolution 687, 
divided into nine sections, inter alia urged Iraq and Kuwait to respect the boundary between the 
two countries and stated that Iraq was liable for any loss, damage and injury inflicted upon 
Kuwait, demanding further that Iraq hand over any remaining property seized from Kuwait. The 
resolution was passed, after an extended meeting on 3 April 1991, by 12 votes to one against 
(Cuba) with two abstentions (Ecuador and Yemen). Iraq accepted the provisions of the 
resolution on 6 April 1991. 
101  United Nations Security Council Resolution 692 UN Doc S/RES/0692 (1991) adopted on 20 May 
1991. See also (1991) 30 International Legal Materials 864. The Compensation Commission had 
by the late 1990s already awarded the Kuwaiti authorities hundreds of millions of dollars for 
the cost of extinguishing the well-head fires: see, in particular, Alford RP “Well blowout control 
claim” (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 287 at 288. 
102  See, in particular, Reyhani (2007) at 339 n 60. 
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Although Security Council Resolution 687 has reinforced awareness among states 
that they may be held accountable should they act in violation of the jus ad bellum, it 
has also indirectly secured enhanced protection for the natural environment during 
an armed conflict.103    
 Arguably, the motivation for choosing the Security Council to investigate 
complaints made in terms of the ENMOD Convention is to be found in its ability to 
impose sanctions under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter. However, 
whatever the true motivation may be for electing the Security Council to investigate 
complaints in its discretion, this particular mechanism for redress under the 
Convention appears to be rather inadequate in the circumstances. 
 Secondly, the protection afforded by Article 1(2) of the Convention is also not 
sufficient in so far as it requires of States Parties not to assist, encourage or induce 
any state, group of states or international organisations to engage in the proscribed 
activities. Recent developments in international law reveal, however, that states 
may choose to support organisations who engage in terrorist activities and (other) 
non-state actors who do not squarely fall into any of the proscribed categories. The 
question thus arises whether or not a state that induces non-state actors to carry 
out environmental warfare would fall foul of the provisions of the Convention. 
 Thirdly, some concern exists regarding the scope of the Convention. Dinstein 
rightly points out that the Convention’s protection only applies to States Parties.104 
Thus, if environmental modification is done outside the territory of a State Party 
(such as on the High Seas), the Convention would not apply. Article 1(1) thus does 
not consider the fact that the results of environmental modification can have a 
trans-boundary effect. Consequently, in instances where the trans-boundary effect 
of environmental modification in armed conflict is felt by a state that is not a party 
to the Convention, there would be no liability under its proscriptive regime.         
 There also exists no liability for damage to the environment where 
environmental modification occurs accidentally or as a consequence of a particular 
means and/or method of warfare. This is due to the fact that Article 2 of the 
Convention provides a mens rea requirement insofar as  the modification must be 
“deliberate”. This provision marks a departure from the additional element of 
foreseeability (“may be expected”) which is contained in Article 35(3) of Additional 
Protocol I.   
 Finally, the Convention also provides no redress for a breach of its provisions.105 
There is no reference to either compensation or (legal) sanction.106 When harm 
                                               
103  See, in particular, Roberts & Guelff (2000) at 408. 
104  See, in particular, Dinstein (2001) at 540. Although only applicable to States Parties, there 
appears to be general agreement that the environment is entitled to “special protection during 
both international and non-international armed conflicts”: see, in particular, Gill & Fleck (2010) 
at 266. 
105  See Chamorro SP & Hammond E Addressing Environmental Modifications in post-Cold War 
Conflict (2001) available at http://www.edmonds-institute.org/pimiento.html (accessed 12 
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occurs, support assistance is all that is required, and even in such instances, the 
Security Council has to determine that a State Party has been harmed or is likely to 
be harmed”.   
 Applicable provisions of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 1980 (the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons) and its three Protocols will be examined next.   
 
4.3 The Convention on Conventional Weapons and Annexed Protocols     
The Convention on Conventional Weapons and its three annexed Protocols were 
adopted on 10 October 1980.107 The fourth paragraph of its Preamble reiterates the 
“triple cumulative standard”108 contained in Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I 
and expressly stipulates that “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of 
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment”. 
 Of particular importance is an amendment to Article 1 of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons, brought about in 2001, which refers to common Article 3 to 
the four Geneva Conventions and thus extends the field of application to non-
international armed conflicts.109 
 Of the three annexed Protocols to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, two 
are of specific relevance to the protection of the environment during armed conflict, 
notably the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Mines, Booby 
Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions and Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III). To this end, Protocol II 
prohibits the use of booby traps on “historic monuments, works of art or places of 
worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’ and 
animals”.110 Article 2(4) of Protocol III prohibits the use of incendiary weapons on 
the “forest or other kinds of plant cover”, but an exception is allowed where such 
forests or plants are used to “cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other 
military objects” or are “themselves military objectives”. Article 2(4) of Protocol III 
thus addresses the issue of environmental protection directly.   
 Oeter rightly points out111 that Protocol III exceeds the provisions of Additional 
Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention in so far as the former does not adhere to the 
                                                                                                                                            
September 2010). 
106  Ibid. 
107  UN Document A/CONF 95/15. 
108  This term is used by UNEP: see, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 12.  
109  Ibid. 
110  See, in particular, Art 6(b)(ix) and Art 6(b)(x) of Protocol II of 1980. 
111  See, in particular, Oeter S “Method and means of combat” in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook of 
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standards of “widespread, long-standing and severe effects” which the latter two 
instruments both seem to uphold. Instead, Protocol II would seem to apply where 
the effects of an armed conflict is “spatial” and “limited”, thus possibly limiting the 
efficacy of Additional Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention in creating a “wide-
reaching duty”112 to secure effective protection for the environment during wartime. 
 Yet, besides this development, neither the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
and Protocol III marks any improvement as far as liability for damage to the 
environment during armed conflict is concerned. The reason is to be found in the 
fact that no liability regime and/or system of redress for a violation of these two key 
instruments is established. 
 As a means to address the absence of a liability regime in Protocol II, an Amended 
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices (the Amended Protocol) was adopted in 1996. Article 7(1)(i) and Article 
7(1)(j) of the Amended Protocol contain similar provisions as Article 6(b)(ix) and 
Article 6(b)(x) of Protocol II. The Amended Protocol goes further, however, in that it 
provides that States Parties should “take steps to prevent and suppress violations of 
the Protocol by persons or on territory under their jurisdiction or control”.113 On the 
measures envisaged, Article 14(2) encourages states to impose penal sanctions 
under their municipal law and thus the Amended Protocol envisages a liability 
regime which is the duty of States Parties to uphold.  
 The established liability regime is, however, problematic for two reasons. First, 
the Amended Protocol only contains provisions on individual (criminal) 
responsibility. It neither contains provisions on the liability of states for non-
compliance nor for any redress for victims of state violations. And secondly, Article 
14(1) of the Amended Protocol also fails to establish a mechanism for supervision or 
for the verification of any violation of its provisions. 
 The most pertinent aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention as these relate 
to the impact of armed conflict on the natural environment will be examined next. 
 
4.4 The Chemical Weapons Convention 
Although the Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted in January 1993, it only 
came into force in 1997.114 Chemical substances have both a direct and acute impact 
                                                                                                                                            
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995) 105 at 117. 
112  This term is suggested by UNEP: see, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 12.   
113  See, in particular, Art 14(1) of the Additional Protocol of 1996. 
114  Approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 30 November 1992 and opened for 
signature on 13 January 1993. The Chemical Weapons Convention remained open for signature 
until its entry into force on 29 April 1997, 180 days after the deposit of the 65th instrument of 
ratification by Hungary. The Chemical Weapons Convention augments the Geneva Protocol of 
1925 for chemical weapons and includes extensive verification measures such as on-site 
inspections. It does not, however, cover biological weapons. 
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on the (natural) environment115 and, for this reason, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention imposes obligations on States Parties not to develop, produce, transfer, 
stockpile or retain chemical weapons. In fact, Article 1 specifically prohibits the use 
of chemical weapons, including assisting, encouraging or inducing anyone to engage 
in any of the prohibited activities. States Parties are mandated to destroy all 
chemical weapons owned and abandoned on the territory of another State Party or 
possessed by them.  Article 1(5) furthermore obliges States Parties not to use riot 
control agents (such as tear gas) as a method of warfare.. 
 In relation to the environment, Articles 4(10), 5(11) and 7(1) of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention mandate States Parties to ensure the protection of the 
environment during transportation, sampling, storage, destruction and 
implementation of all chemical weapons. Article 12 of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention provides for measures to redress an existing situation and to ensure 
compliance, including sanctions, and the Conference of the States Parties (the 
Conference) is empowered to “redress and remedy any situation which contravenes 
the provisions of the [Chemical Weapons] Convention”.116 
 Two bodies have been assigned a role to redress a situation that may arise, the 
Conference and the Executive Council. The Conference, upon recommendation of the 
Executive Council, may restrict or suspend a State Party’s rights and privileges 
under the Convention. The Conference may also recommend collective measures to 
States Parties where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention 
results from activities prohibited, such as military use of chemicals for warfare, and 
these measures must conform to international law. Where a situation is grave, the 
issue should be brought to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security 
Council. The Convention thus seeks to guard against the use of chemicals causing 
damage to the environment, provides a regime of sanctions and also appears to 
cover non-international armed conflicts as it mandates States Parties to establish 
both civil and criminal liabilities under international law.  
 In order to conclude the assessment of relevant provisions contained in 
international instruments that are specifically aimed at protecting the environment 
during armed conflict, three further instruments must be considered. These are: the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Convention on Anti-Personnel 
Mines); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their 
Destruction (the Bacteriological Weapons Convention); and the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons Treaty (the Nuclear Weapons Treaty). Each of these three 
Conventions will now be considered briefly. 
 
                                               
115  See, in general, Mrema et al (2009) at 15.  
116  See, in particular, Art 13(19)(k) of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. 
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4.5 The Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines 
The Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines was adopted in 1997 and partly imposes 
an obligation on States Parties not to use anti-personnel mines in armed conflict and 
to destroy, or ensure the destruction of, anti-personnel mines.117 In carrying out this 
destruction, States Parties must provide details of environmental implications (in 
case of a further extension of a previous request for extension of a deadline to 
destroy)118 and the safety and environmental standards observed. The provisions 
relating to the protection of the environment under the Convention of Anti-
Personnel Mines relates to disarmament, yet there is no liability regime established 
for failure to comply with or to implement its provisions.119 
 
4 6 The Bacteriological Weapons Convention 
The Bacteriological Weapons Convention of 1972 does not prohibit the use of 
bacteriological weapons as such, as this is specifically provided for under the 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Cases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925. The Bacteriological 
Weapons Convention extends beyond the latter, however, in one significant respect, 
namely by prohibiting the degradation of the natural environment.120 Complaints 
must be directed to the Security Council.121 And yet, even in the event that the 
Security Council may decide that there is (or has been) any exposure to danger, 
there is no liability regime established under the Convention.122 
 
4 7 The Nuclear Weapons Treaty 
The Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1968 relates to disarmament, and thus its key 
objectives relate to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 
Nuclear Weapons Convention does not ban the use of nuclear weapons in armed 
conflict, even though the ICJ has on occasion expressly acknowledged that the use of 
nuclear weapons would be a “serious danger to future generations” and has the 
“potential to damage the future environment, food and marine ecosystem”, 
including “genetic defects and illnesses in future generations”.123 Yet, even so, the ICJ 
has confirmed that nuclear weapons may be used in self-defence as long as their use 
                                               
117  See, in particular, Art 1(1) and 1(2) of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. 
118  See, in particular, Arti 5(4) of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. 
119  See, in particular, Art 7(f) of the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines. 
120  See, in particular, Art 2 of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. 
121  See, in particular, Art 6 of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. 
122  See, in particular, Art 7 of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. 
123  Per Koroma J (dissenting) in Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 1996 ICJ Reports 226 para 35.   
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is proportionate to the pursuit of military objectives.124 The principle that states 
may not engage in activities within their territory that cause damage to the 
environment of other states or to areas beyond the limits of their (national) 
jurisdiction, has also been confirmed by the ICJ when it declared that 
“the existence of the general obligation of states to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond 
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment”.125 
IHL treaty provisions that indirectly protect the natural environment during armed 
conflict will be explored next. 
 
5 IHL TREATY PROVISIONS THAT INDIRECTLY PROTECT THE 
ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
The rules of IHL treaty law that protect the natural environment indirectly can be 
subdivided into the following five categories, namely: (a) rules limiting or 
prohibiting certain weapons and methods of warfare; (b) clauses protecting civilian 
objects and property; (c) clauses protecting cultural sites; (d) rules pertaining to 
installations containing dangerous forces; and (e) limitations on certain specifically 
defined areas. Each of these categories will now be examined.  
 
5 .1 Limitations on means and methods of warfare  
Many weapons that are created have the potential to cause serious and long-lasting 
damage to the environment. However, by limiting the creation and use of such 
weapons, it could be argued that such a restriction serves to protect the 
environment indirectly. UNEP is rightly of the opinion, however, that “very little has 
been achieved”126 in so far as the enforcement of the law of The Hague127 is 
concerned. Consequently, most instances thus far have pertained to the law of 
                                               
124  Ibid paras 33 and 34. For an account of the ICRC’s understanding of the ICJ’s judgment, see 
Bugnion F “The International Committee of the Red Cross and nuclear weapons: From 
Hiroshima to the dawn of the 21st century” 87 No 859 International Review of the Red Cross 511 
at 520-523.  
125  Ibid para 29. 
126  See, in general, Mrema et al (2009) at 14. See also Art 22 of the Fourth Hague Convention which 
expressly states that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited”. UNEP rightly points out that Art 22 of the Fourth Hague Convention is regarded as 
“one of the most significant provisions in the regulations in so far as a precautionary imperative 
can be implied from it in the absence of explicit provisions”: Ibid 10 at 14. 
127  Notably the Fourth Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 
1907. 
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Geneva128 which is intended to protect certain categories of persons, including 
civilian persons and civilian objects. 
 
5.2 Protection of civilian objects and property  
UNEP rightly argues that the various measures that relate to the protection of 
civilian objects and civilian property “could provide a more effective legal basis for 
protecting the environment during armed conflict than those protecting the 
environment per se”.129 However, these provisions would only find application 
under existing IHL treaty law.130 To this end, the Fourth Geneva Convention,131 
which pertains to the treatment of civilian persons and property, declares non-
combatants “protected persons” whose lives and livelihoods shall be kept safe 
during an armed conflict by any Party to the conflict or, in the event of an 
occupation, by the Occupying Power.132 Article 147 expressly includes the 
“extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” among the acts constituting 
grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention.133   
 
5.3 Protection of cultural objects and property 
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict (the Hague Convention on Cultural Property) of 1954134 and its Protocols 
seek to accord enhanced protection to civilian objects during armed conflict. Article 
1(a) defines cultural property as    
                                               
128  Notably persons who do not, or who no longer, directly participate in the hostilities: see, in 
particular, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.  
129  Emphasis added. See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 16. 
130  Such as The Hague Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 which 
stipulate that it is forbidden “to destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction 
or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”. In addition, the “enemy 
property” could include protected areas and environmental resources which would, as such, be 
indirectly protected by the Hague Regulations. 
131  The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949. 
132  Art 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 defines protected persons as “those who, at a 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or 
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not 
nationals”. 
133  See Art 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. Furthermore, in the context of 
occupation, see Article 53 which states that “any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or 
personal property belonging to the individual or collectively to individuals, or to the State, or to 
other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations”. 
134  Adopted in The Hague, Netherlands, on 14 May 1954 and entered into force on 7 August 1956. 
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“movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; 
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic 
interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or 
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of 
books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above”.  
Cultural property would also include “buildings whose main and effective purpose is 
to preserve or exhibit”135 movable cultural property such as museums, large 
libraries and depositories of archives, including refuges intended to shelter, in the 
event of armed conflict, the movable cultural property. Centres “containing a large 
amount of cultural property” would also be included under this definition.136 
 In essence, the Hague Convention on Cultural Property provides for the 
protection,137 safeguard138 and respect139 for cultural property. To achieve these 
objectives, there are several provisions relating to the grant of special protection for 
the purpose of sheltering movable property,140 immunity of cultural property under 
special circumstances,141 transport142 and the creation and use of a distinctive 
emblem.143 The Convention expressly applies to international armed conflicts and to 
cases of occupation of territories,144 and Article 28 allows States Parties to 
“prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions” on “persons who commit or 
order” breaches of its provisions. The provision relating to liability only concerns 
individual responsibility; there is no liability regime for violations perpetrated by 
States Parties. And, since the Convention does not apply to non-international armed 
conflicts, the liability regime consequently only relates to violations of its provisions 
committed by individuals during an international armed conflict. 
 The Regulations for the Execution of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the Regulations) provide under Article 5 
that the Protective Powers, established under Article 21 of the Convention, should 
investigate violations. Article 6 of the Regulations burdens the Commissioner 
General with this responsibility. And yet there exists no regime of sanctions for 
violations; the Regulations only create powers of investigation into any violations. 
 The First Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict (the First Hague Protocol) of 1954, which only applies to 
                                               
135  See, in particular, Article 1(b) of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
136  See, in particular, Article 1(c) of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
137  See, in particular, Article 2 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
138  See, in particular, Article 3 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
139  See, in particular, Article 4 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
140  See, in particular, Art 8 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954. 
141  See, in particular, Art 9 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
142  See, in particular, Arts 12, 13 and 14 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
143  See, in particular, Arts 16 and 17 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
144  See, in particular, Art 18 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property. 
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international armed conflicts,145 prohibits the export and sale of cultural property 
from an occupied territory.146 Yet, unlike the Hague Convention on Cultural 
Property, the First Hague Protocol fails to provide for any liability in case of a breach 
of its provisions.  
 To remedy the deficiencies of both The Hague Convention on Cultural Property 
and the First Hague Protocol in the former Yugoslavia, the Second Hague Protocol 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (the Second 
Hague Protocol) was adopted in 1999.147 Not surprisingly, the Second Hague 
Protocol seeks to widen the scope of protection accorded to cultural property. To 
this end, Articles 3 and 22 of the Second Hague Protocol extend the protection of 
cultural property to non-international armed conflicts.148   
 Chapter 4 of the Second Hague Protocol introduces a liability regime which 
covers individual criminal responsibility149 and which both adopts the principle of 
universality and provides for the extradition of offenders.150 Articles 15(1) and 21 
expressly include offences such as attacks on protected cultural property and the 
misuse of cultural property, and thus remedy the First Hague Protocol by creating 
both an offence and express liability for the illicit export, removal and transfer from 
an occupied territory of cultural property.151 Of particular significance is Article 
15(2) which provides for the sanction of domestic criminalisation and extends 
responsibility against persons other than those who directly committed the 
                                               
145  Adopted in The Hague, Netherlands, on 14 May 1954. 
146  See, in particular, Part I of the First Hague Protocol of 1954. 
147  In The Hague, Netherlands, on 26 March 1999. 
148  See, in particular, Chapter 5: “The protection of cultural property in armed conflict not of an 
international character” of the Second Hague Protocol of 1999.  
149  See, in particular, Art 15(2) of the Second Hague Protocol which reads: “Each Party shall adopt 
such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the 
offences set forth in this Article and to make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties. 
When doing so, Parties shall comply with general principles of law and international law, 
including the rules extending individual criminal responsibility to persons other than those who 
directly commit the act”.     
150  See, in particular, Art 17(1) of the Second Hague Protocol which stipulates: “1. The Party in 
whose territory the alleged offender of an offence set forth in Article 15 sub-paragraphs 1 (a) to 
(c) is found to be present shall, if it does not extradite that person, submit, without exception 
whatsoever and without undue delay, the case to its competent authorities, for the purpose of 
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with its domestic law or with, if applicable, the 
relevant rules of international law”.  
151  See Art 15(1) of the Second Hague Protocol which reads: “1. Any person commits an offence 
within the meaning of this Protocol if that person intentionally and in violation of the 
Convention or this Protocol commits any of the following acts: a. making cultural property 
under enhanced protection the object of attack; b. using cultural property under enhanced 
protection or its immediate surroundings in support of military action; c. extensive destruction 
or appropriation of cultural property protected under the Convention and this Protocol; d. 
making cultural property protected under the Convention and this Protocol the object of attack; 
e. theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against cultural property 
protected under the Convention”.  
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proscribed act or acts. The Second Hague Protocol also allows for state 
responsibility and repatriation under Article 38, albeit that no sanctions for a 
violation of state responsibility are provided. There is also no mechanism provided 
for the enforcement of state responsibility. 
 On the whole, the Second Hague Protocol thus provides a somewhat improved 
regime of protection compared to that which preceded it. Not only does the Second 
Hague Protocol clarify the particular measures of precaution to be implemented, but 
it also articulates more clearly the types of conduct that would lead to criminal 
sanctions and insists that States Parties exercise jurisdiction over such violations.152 
In addition, the Second Hague Protocol extends the Hague Convention on Cultural 
Property’s protection to non-international armed conflicts.153 It furthermore 
introduces innovative concepts that could serve to significantly enhance the 
protection of all natural resources in wartime, to the degree that these could be 
conceptualised as cultural property in terms of Article 1 of the Hague Convention on 
Cultural Property.154 
 
5.4 Protection of industrial installations containing dangerous forces  
Article 56 of Additional Protocol I proscribes “works or installations containing 
dangerous forces” including “dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations” 
as objects of attack, even though these objects may be military objectives.155  Yet it is 
noticeable that oil fields and petrochemical plants are not, for example, explicitly 
mentioned and may, according to UNEP, “have been intentionally excluded”.156 The 
result of this exclusion means that Article 56 did not cover the attacks by Iraq on the 
Kuwaiti oil fields during the first Gulf War.157 In addition, the only meaningful 
extension provided for by Additional Protocol II is to be found in Article 15, 
extending the categories of protection contained in Article 56 of Additional Protocol 
I to non-international armed conflicts and thus securing protection for dykes, dams 
and nuclear electrical generating stations against being targeted in internal armed 
conflict situations. There appears to be general agreement, however, that Article 56 
does not constitute customary IHL.158   
 
                                               
152  See, in general, Mrema et al (2009) at 18. 
153  See, in particular, Art 22(1) of the Second Hague Protocol of 1999 which contains an express 
reference to non-international armed conflicts and reads: “1. This Protocol shall apply in the 
event of an armed conflict not of an international character, occurring within the territory of one 
of the Parties”. 
154  See, in general, Mrema et al (2009) at 18. 
155  See, in particular, Art 56(1) of Additional Protocol I. 
156  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 18. 
157  Ibid. UNEP also states that neither the 1999 Kosovo conflict nor the 2006 Israel-Lebanon 
conflict were covered by Art 56 of Additional Protocol I. 
158  See, in particular, Gill & Fleck (2010) at 267. 
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5.5 Limitations based on targeted areas   
The limitations based on targeted areas can be subdivided into three categories: (a) 
territories under occupation; (b) neutral territories; and (c) demilitarised zones. 
The Hague Regulations were the first to articulate the rules applicable to occupied 
territories. To this end, Article 55 of the Fourth Hague Convention spells out the 
rules of ususfructus for the Occupying Power. Article 55 expressly provides that the 
Occupying Power must exercise its right of use over the occupied property in such a 
manner that it does not cause damage or destruction to it. An exception is, however, 
made in the case of military necessity. Furthermore, Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention lists as expressly prohibited “any destruction by the Occupying Power of 
real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons” 
in occupied territories, “except where such destruction is rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations”.159  
 Even though the rules applicable to neutral territories emanate from customary 
IHL, these rules too were largely codified in The Hague Conventions.160 The idea of 
neutral territories is based on essentially two requirements, namely the “duty of 
abstention and impartiality” and secondly, that the “relations between belligerents 
and neutrals” are to be governed by the “law applicable in times of peace”.161   
 Areas that are formally proposed by any party to the conflict as “demilitarised” 
zones can be established by way of a written agreement between the parties “in the 
regions where fighting is taking place”.162 The express object of such “demilitarised” 
zones is “to shelter from the effects of war” persons who do not (or who no longer) 
take an active part in the hostilities. Any violation of the written agreement will 
constitute a grave breach of IHL. Areas like Antarctica and outer space are also 
specifically protected by way of treaties from the impact of armed conflict.163    
                                               
159  According to UNEP, the special status of occupied territories and the accompanying legal regime 
“may offer some guiding principles for dealing with similar situations in the context of non-
international armed conflict”. The damage caused to the natural environment and valuable 
resources is often directly due to the fact that such activities “finance armed forces and their 
weaponry”: see, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 19. 
160  See, in particular, The Hague Convention V and The Hague Convention XIII of 1907. UNEP is 
rightly of the opinion that the “more recent treaties have not added to this codification, other 
than a few details”: see Mrema et al (2009) at 19. 
161  Ibid. With respect to the environment, this customary law principle is articulated in Article II(5) 
(“General Principles of International Law”) of the ICRC Guidelines for Military Manuals and 
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, where it is 
stipulated that “obligations relating to the protection of the environment towards States not 
party to an armed conflict (e.g. neighbouring States) and in relation to areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction (e.g. the High Seas) are not affected by the existence of the armed conflict to 
the extent that they are not inconsistent with the applicable law of armed conflict”. See also, in 
general, Gasser (1996) at 230-237. 
162  See, in particular, Art 15 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Art 60 of Additional Protocol I.  
163  See, in particular, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 




6 ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION  
6.1 Existing machinery   
The treaties of IHL provide various mechanisms for implementing their substantive 
provisions. Included among these are: (a) the IHL regime of Protecting Powers; (b) 
the International Fact-Finding Commission; (c) specific functions designated to the 
ICRC pertaining to the interpretation and monitoring of the implementation of IHL; 
(d) the general obligation to “ensure respect for” IHL; (e) the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility; and (f) the obligation to ensure that the provisions of the 
four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols are disseminated widely by 
states.  
 The existing machinery governing enforcement and implementation is primarily 
concerned with issues of state responsibility. The system of Protecting Powers is 
governed under the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, and, in 
essence, require that Protecting Powers must both attend to the implementation of 
the provisions of these international instruments and “safeguard the interests of the 
parties to a conflict and their nationals on enemy territory”.164  
 Article 90 of Additional Protocol I provides for the establishment of an 
International Fact-Finding Commission (the Commission) equipped with the 
authority to investigate serious violations and grave breaches of the four Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols. The functions of the Commission are of 
a facilitative nature, conducted through its offices, and would include the restoration 
of respect for the four Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols.165 The 
Commission’s competence depends on a special declaration of acceptance166 and 
struggled initially to garner sufficient state support. Although the Commission was 
eventually constituted in 1991 with receipt of the twenty-ninth state declaration, it 
has never been utilised largely due to a lack of support from States Parties.167 
 As a neutral and independent humanitarian institution, the ICRC’s mission is to 
provide assistance and protection to certain categories of persons during armed 
conflict. The ICRC’s various mandates are defined in the four Geneva Conventions 
and the ICRC may thus “find itself acting as a substitute for Protecting Powers”.168 
The ICRC also has a recognised right of initiative that assigns to it a role in 
monitoring the implementation of IHL. 
                                                                                                                                            
Celestial Bodies of 1987. 
164  See, in particular, Bouvier ICRC Report 1992 para 6.1. 
165  See, in general, Reyhani (2007) at 338. 
166  The special declaration of acceptance is provided for in terms of Art 90(2)(c) of Additional 
Protocol I. 
167  See, in general, Reyhani (2007) at 338 n 57. 
168  See, in particular, Bouvier ICRC Report 1992 para 6.3. 
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 Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol I 
stipulates that the Contracting States are under an obligation to “respect and to 
ensure respect for” these key IHL instruments “in all circumstances”. Common 
Article 1 thus reiterates the obligation of all States Parties to make sure that 
humanitarian commitments are met by each and every State Party and, in particular, 
when engaged in an armed conflict.169 It goes without saying that the duty to protect 
the natural environment in wartime constitutes such a fundamental humanitarian 
obligation. Therefore, by relying on the clause of si omnes, any third state could be 
said to have an interest in damage caused to the natural environment for the 
duration as well as beyond the termination of an armed conflict and could, in 
principle, invoke the appropriate judicial machinery that exists under the United 
Nations, notably the ICJ.170  
 The possibility of individual criminal responsibility has existed under IHL long 
before the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC, albeit at the domestic level. 
States Parties to the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols “are 
required to take all possible measures to ensure that their obligations are properly 
discharged in time of war”.171 One of the most significant of these measures is the 
adoption of criminal sanctions at the national level.172 In this context, Article 147 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention is of particular significance as it clearly establishes 
the unjustified destruction of property as a war crime, and although causing 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment is not, as such, a 
grave breach of Additional Protocol I, it may be part of grave breaches of other 
provisions.173 
 Finally, each State Party to the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols must ensure that the text of these instruments is disseminated as widely 
as possible throughout its territory in both peacetime and wartime. States Parties 
must, inter alia, incorporate the study of the subject into their programmes of 
military and, if possible, civilian instruction. 
 
6.2 Individual criminal responsibility: the Rome Statute  
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the ICC expressly includes as a war crime     
“intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental 
loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and 
                                               
169  Ibid para 6.4. 
170  See, in general, Reyhani (2007) at 339. 
171  See, in particular, Bouvier ICRC Report 1992 para 6.5. 
172  Ibid. 
173  Ibid. 
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severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”.174  
Although this formulation is, for the most part, based on Article 35(3) of Additional 
Protocol I,175 Dinstein rightly points out that the Rome Statute contains two 
significant alterations: 
 “(i) the Statute requires both intention and knowledge of the outcome, rather than 
either intention or expectation as set forth in the Protocol I; and (ii) for the war crime to 
crystallize, the damage to the natural environment must be clearly excessive in relation 
to the military advantage anticipated”.176  
Dinstein explains that the first alteration is necessitated by the conception of the act 
as a war crime which will establish “individual criminal responsibility and liability”, 
and thus “only an individual acting with both knowledge and intent would have the 
necessary mens rea exposing him to penal sanctions”.177 Yet this requirement, 
coupled with the prohibition of subjectivity, could place a heavy evidentiary burden 
on the prosecution.178 The possible application of the provisions of the Rome Statute 
may thus be hampered by the fact that both intention and knowledge of the 
outcome is required, instead of either intention or expectation as is the case in 
Additional Protocol I. 
The second alteration, according to Dinstein, is derived from the “amalgamation 
in one paragraph of the materiae of the protection of civilians (or civilian objects) 
and that of the natural environment”, and so a “balance must be struck between the 
military advantage anticipated” and “any incidental injury to civilians or civilian 
objects”.179 
Liability under the Rome Statute thus relates to a specific intention which is 
different from the intention and foreseeability (“intended, or may be expected”) test 
contained in Article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I. In this regard the Rome Statute 
also differs from the ENMOD Convention, as Article 8(2)(b)(iv) clearly requires that 
all three thresholds must be met simultaneously and, as a consequence, the Rome 
                                               
174  Emphasis added. For a detailed discussion of the Elements of Crimes under the Rome Statute, 
see Dörmann K, Doswald-Beck L and Kolb R Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Sources and commentary (2003) at 161-176. 
175  Ibid 161 at 166. Art 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute, in fact, contains traces of Arts 35(3), 51(5) 
and 51(5) as well as of Arts 55(1), 83(3)(b) and 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I: see, in 
particular, Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law (2005) at 350 para 1041. See also, in 
general, Schabas WA The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 
(2010) at 231-232. 
176  Dinstein (2001) at 535. 
177  Ibid at 536. See also, in general, Werle (2005) at 352 para 1047. 
178  Ibid 267 at 351 para 1044. 
179  Ibid 523 at 536. Emphasis added. Dinstein explains that this would include the natural 
environment (as a civilian object), unless part of the environment, such as a forest, “is deemed a 
military objective in the circumstances prevailing at the time”: see, in particular, Dinstein (2001) 
at 536. 
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Statute may well experience the same difficulty as Additional Protocol I in that it 
may prove challenging to satisfy the cumulative threshold test.180 It furthermore 
appears that while the provisions of the Rome Statute would cover situations such 
as Iraq’s intentional damage to the Kuwaiti oil wells, its liability regime can only 
apply to natural persons and not to states.181  
It is to be welcomed, however, that the war crimes provisions contained under 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute would apply equally to both international and non-
international armed conflicts.182 Any intentional attack by an individual on the 
natural environment which meets the criteria set out in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) would 
accordingly be punishable as a war crime under the Rome Statute, irrespective of 
whether such an act was committed during an international armed conflict or 
during the course of a non-international armed conflict.   
    
6.3 Dissemination and national implementation   
Arguably, the most effective means of addressing the protection of the natural 
environment during armed conflict is through the national implementation of such 
rules. Non-governmental organisations that have international standing, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (the ICRC), have drafted proposals for the 
implementation of existing rules of IHL to be incorporated into the military manuals 
of the armed forces.183 The Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the 
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (the Guidelines) proposed 
by the ICRC were submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1994. 
Without formally approving the Guidelines, the General Assembly invited all states 
to “give due consideration to the possibility of incorporating them into their military 
manuals and other instructions addressed to their military personnel”.184  
                                               
180  See also, in general, Reyhani (2007) at 340 and Dinstein (2001) at 535-536.  
181  See, in general, Dörmann et al (2003) at 176. See also Nanda VP “International environmental 
norms applicable to nuclear activities with particular focus on decision of international 
tribunals and international settlements” available at http://www.law.du.edu/ 
documents/djilp/International-Environmental-Norms-Applicable-to-Nuclear-Activites.pdf 
(accessed 2 September 2010). 
182  Art 8 of the Rome Statute conceives of war crimes as acts which can be committed within the 
context of both international and non-international armed conflicts: see, in particular, Art 
8(2)(c) (“Violations of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions”) as well as 8(2)(e) 
(“Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character”) of the Rome Statute. See also, in general, Werle (2005) at 352 para 
1048. But compare Schabas (2010) at 232 n 260. 
183  See, in particular, Resolution 1 adopted by the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1995. The Resolution inter alia urged the ICRC, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the National Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies to “contribute to the effort for achieving better implementation of 
international humanitarian law, the main objective being to prevent violations from occurring”: 
see, in particular, Gasser (1996) at 230. 
184  See GA res 49/50 of 9 December 1994. The Guidelines have been published as an annex to the 
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The Guidelines are intended as a mere “tool”185 to facilitate the instruction of 
armed forces. In essence, the Guidelines consist of a summary of the existing 
applicable rules of IHL which must both be known and respected by members of the 
armed forces, and thus their aim is to “contribute in a practical and effective way to 
raising awareness” of the natural environment in time of armed conflict.186 In turn, 
Green Cross International has explained the dangers the natural environment is 
exposed to during armed conflict and has rightly motivated that a culture of 
compliance, coupled with IHL, is the appropriate way to proceed.187  
However, it is self-evident that a change in the attitudes of states towards the 
natural environment would be far more effective than any ex post facto 
condemnation, political pressure and, in the final instance, prosecution of violations. 
Yet for the Guidelines to serve their purpose an update will be required, coupled 
with their subsequent consideration by the General Assembly for adoption. UNEP 
rightly advocates the latter, due to the “rapid transformations in the methods and 
means of warfare”188 as well as the marked proliferation of non-international armed 
conflicts, especially on the African continent. Viewed in such a context, the 
Guidelines should thus ideally also explain fundamental concepts contained in 
Additional Protocol I, consider the precise relationship between the Rome Statute 
and IHL, examine the scope of possible application of IEL during armed conflict, and 
explore, in sufficient detail, the protection accorded to the environment during non-
international armed conflicts.189  
 
6.4 The quandary of non-international armed conflicts 
 The rules pertaining to non-international armed conflict are less developed than 
those specifically regulating international armed conflicts.190 Article 3 common to 
the four Geneva Conventions is, for example, silent on protecting the environment 
during civil wars and only addresses humanitarian concerns in the most basic sense. 
Additional Protocol II likewise contains no provisions relating directly to the 
environment. However, Article 14 which concerns the protection of objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population has a direct impact on the 
environment, proscribing attacks on agricultural areas, irrigation works, foodstuffs 
and drinking water installations and supplies. The same applies to Article 15 which 
protects “works and installations containing dangerous forces”. Bouvier rightly 
points out, however, that other legal provisions pertaining to the environment, such 
                                                                                                                                            
United Nations Secretary-General’s Report of 19 August 1994: see UN Doc A/49/323 (1994). 
185  This term is employed by Gasser: see Gasser (1995) at 641. 
186  See, in particular, Gasser (1996) at 231. 
187   Ibid. 
188  See, in particular, Mrema et al (2009) at 5. 
189  Ibid. 
190  See, in general, Bouvier ICRC Report 1992 para 5. 
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as those contained in international treaties, are likely to remain enforceable against 
a state in which there exists a non-international armed conflict.191  
 Due to the fact that only a small number of states had ratified Additional Protocol 
II by the late 1980s, this instrument could not be applied in respect of the non-
international armed conflicts in, for example, Angola, Haiti, Somalia and Sri 
Lanka.192 The general principles of IHL and customary law could, therefore, be used 
effectively to apply to situations not expressly provided for in the case of non-
international armed conflicts, as there is no specific treaty norm that explicitly 
addresses the issue of environmental damage during non-international armed 
conflicts. 
 
6.5 Customary IHL 
The rules, principles and norms of IHL will have acquired the status of custom when 
they enjoy “general or widespread”193 application. And since the four principles of 
distinction, military necessity, proportionality and humanity could well be said to 
enjoy such a level of application, UNEP rightly argues that these fundamental 
principles would “complement and underpin the various IHL instruments and apply 
to all states”.194 UNEP also correctly suggests that the grave breaches provisions 
(this is unfortunately a standard phrase used in IHL) contained in the four Geneva 
Conventions and in Additional Protocol I would enjoy the status of customary 
IHL,195 albeit that the causing of “widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
environment”196 is not expressly mentioned.  
Other provisions contained in the four Geneva Conventions and in Additional 
Protocol I could be interpreted as providing protection to the natural environment 
during armed conflict. Specific examples include Article 50 of the First Geneva 
Convention which expressly refers to “extensive destruction of property, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”197 and 
Article 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I which prohibits the “launching [of] an 
indiscriminate attack affecting civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause excessive damage to . . . civilian objects”.198 
                                               
191  Ibid.  
192  See, in general, Mrema et al (2009) at 28. 
193  See, in particular, Dugard (2005) at 32. 
194   Except, of course, to those states who persistently object to these four key principles of IHL: 
Mrema et al (2009) 20 n 59. For more on the consequences of a persistent objector in 
international law, see Dugard (2005) at 32. 
195  Ibid at 28. 
196  See, in particular, Art 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Art 85 of Additional Protocol I. 
197  See in this regard also Art 51 of the Second Geneva Convention and Art 147 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. 
198  See, in particular, Art 85(3)(b) of Additional Protocol I. See also Art 85(3)(c) which prohibits 
“launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the 
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Although the four Geneva Conventions enjoy universal ratification, the situation 
is less promising as far as Additional Protocols I and II are concerned. The United 
States has, for example, raised particular objections to Additional Protocol I and has 
hitherto failed to ratify Additional Protocol II.199 It is therefore to be welcomed that 
the ICRC has identified three Rules in their Study on Customary International Law, 
published in 2005200 that could secure enhanced protection for the natural 
environment in wartime. To this end, Rule 43 states that the “general principles of 
the conduct of hostilities apply to the natural environment”.201 And while Rule 44 
stipulates that “methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard 
to the protection and preservation of the natural environment”,202 Rule 45 expressly 
states that the “use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment is prohibited”.203 
The value of the three Rules relate to the fact that they squarely place the 
fundamental principles of IHL, as these relate to the natural environment, within the 
context of customary IHL. The difference in applicability of these three Rules in 
international as opposed to non-international armed conflicts remains open to 
interpretation, however.204 
 
6.6 General statements  
A further category of protection for the natural environment can be found in general 
statements issued at, for example, international conferences.205 Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment of 1972206 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (the Rio Declaration) of 1992207 both express the concern that states 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects”.  
199  See, in particular, Solis (2010) at 123. 
200  See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck L Vols I, II and III (2005). Some states and commentators have, 
however, questioned the expansiveness of the ICRC assessment regarding what constitutes 
customary IHL.  
201  See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck Vol I (2005) at 143-146. 
202  Ibid 147-151. For a basic discussion of Rule 44 in relation to Additional Protocol I, see Hulme 
(2010) at 684-687 and Bothe et al (2010) at 574-575. 
203  Ibid 151-158. 
204  See Mrema et al (2009) at 21. 
205  See, in general, Bothe et al (2010) at 584.   
206  Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972) 11 
International Legal Materials 1415. 
207  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development UN Doc A/CONF151/5/Rev1, (1992) 31 
International Legal Materials 874. A recommendation by the Governing Council of UNEP issued 
in May 1991 proposed that action be taken to prohibit weapons that “cause particularly serious 
effects on the environment”: see UNEP Governing Council 16th Session Resolution 16/11 on 
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have an obligation “to ensure that the activities that fall within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the natural environment of other States or areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. 
 Principle 23 of the Rio Declaration furthermore states that the “environment and 
natural resources of people under oppression, domination and occupation shall be 
protected”. And Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration, in turn, declares that 
“warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
conflict and co-operate in its further development, as necessary”.  
Reyhani rightly argues that these statements provide a challenge to those states 
“willing to embrace them”.208 Consequently, the principles articulated in the 
Stockholm and Rio Declarations are often relied upon to ensure greater compliance 
with various (peacetime) environmental rules during wartime. 
 
7 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS  
This article sought to establish the effectiveness of the various provisions of 
international law relating to the protection of the natural environment during 
armed conflict as these can be divided into general principles, specific provisions as 
well as provisions that can be considered to provide indirect protection to the 
environment. In particular, the regime of liability for environmental damage in 
armed conflict under each of the three categories was examined critically.  
It was shown that, apart from the Chemical Weapons Convention, all other 
treaties dealing specifically with the means and methods of warfare revealed 
serious inadequacies and that some, such as the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons and its Protocols, establish no liability regime whatsoever. International 
instruments that do contain a liability regime, however, reveal serious flaws, to the 
degree that not all categories of armed conflict are addressed and only criminal 
sanctions (with no civil liability) are envisaged, coupled with failure to extend 
liability to States Parties. Some international instruments even fail to provide 
adequate mechanisms for legal redress or, in instances where such redress is 
provided, the mechanisms are flawed.   
There also exists a glaring lack of case law pertaining to the protection of the 
environment during armed conflict, and UNEP highlights the unfortunate reality 
that “in the few instances where judgments were handed down, procedural rather 
than merit-based reasoning has predominated”.209 The lack of case law addressing 
                                                                                                                                            
Military Conflicts and the Environment (31 May 1991), UN Doc A/46/25 (1991). This 
recommendation led directly to the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992. 
208  See, in particular, Reyhani (2007) at 237. 
209  For examples of these instances, see Mrema et al (2009) at 24-28. 
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the responsibility and liability of state violations of IHL may thus well create the 
precarious impression that there exists some “reluctance in enforcing the applicable 
law”210 at the international level.  
And yet the protection of the natural environment has gained considerable 
prominence in the last two decades and many states and (international) 
organisations have endeavoured to support efforts calling for the adequate 
protection of this valuable asset during armed conflict. It is self-evident that a 
balance must be struck between the reality of military necessity and the need to 
ensure the survival of populations and all forms of life that have been entrusted to 
mankind. Dinstein rightly laments that customary international law has not yet 
developed to the degree that both adequate and comprehensive protection is 
afforded to protecting of the environment during wartime.211 
 Even though treaty law has become increasingly more aware of the plight of the 
natural environment during armed conflict, Dinstein justifiably cautions that the 
threshold set by Additional Protocol I could well be said to be too high (especially 
where durability of the environmental damage is concerned) and that the ENMOD 
Convention lends itself to a rather restrictive interpretation.212 Furthermore, some 
intentional and direct damage to the environment is not covered by either the 
ENMOD Convention or Additional Protocol I and, therefore, damage is still, at least 
in so far as these two instruments are concerned, permissible.213 The question thus 
arises as to how the discrepancies inherent to, for example, Additional Protocol I, 
the ENMOD Convention and the Rome Statute can be harmonised.  
The introduction of numerous international instruments must perhaps be viewed 
as a starting point in providing the limitations of (unavoidable) destruction caused 
to the natural environment during armed conflict. Yet if the international 
community is serious about protecting the environment, individuals and organs of 
state must actively ensure dedication to, and compliance with, the jus in bello 
exclusively applicable during armed conflict. This means that all parties to an armed 
conflict must honour their obligations in terms of existing instruments that are 
directly or indirectly relevant to the protection of the natural environment in armed 
conflict,214 irrespective of whether they are States Parties or whether the applicable 
provisions of these instruments may have acquired the status of customary law, 
bearing in mind also that the rules of general (peacetime) law protecting the natural 
environment do, in fact, remain in force during armed conflict.215 
                                               
210  Ibid. 
211  See Dinstein (2001) at 549. 
212  Ibid.  
213  Ibid. 
214  This position has found strong support at the Conference of Experts on the Use of the 
Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare convened by the Canadian Ministry of External 
Affairs from 9-12 July 1992 in Ottawa, Canada: see Gasser (1995) at 639 n 13. 
215  The continued applicability in armed conflict of important sections of the general international 
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Perhaps the most durable answer is to be found in the adoption of an entirely 
new convention expressly intended to address all situations of environmental 
damage caused during (or as a consequence of) armed conflict. Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell rightly point out that the law of armed conflict could be regarded as one of 
the “least sophisticated” branches of “contemporary international law” in that it 
lacks an “institutional structure for supervision of compliance”, and that it thus 
“relies mainly on the good faith of the parties to a conflict for implementation and 
application”.216 Such a convention should thus ideally set a lower threshold for 
damage caused to the natural environment and establish a redress mechanism for 
States Parties. Furthermore, an effective judicial system should be established under 
such a convention to consider issues of liability and redress. This makes sense, as 
issues of impartiality and guarantees of integrity are significant factors at the level 
of international adjudication.217 Under such a convention the Security Council could 
serve as the enforcer of judgments as it is already equipped to exercise this duty in 
terms of Article 94(2) of the United Nations Charter.218 Should legitimate fears exist 
about the ability of the Security Council to ensure the effective implementation of 
judgments,219 a system similar to the one established within the context of the 
European Court of Human Rights may well be considered. In the latter instance, 
judgments are implemented with the aid of a Committee of Ministers which 
facilitates the effective implementation of judgments handed down by the European 
Court of Human Rights.220  
                                                                                                                                            
rules protecting the natural environment was stressed by the International Council of 
Environmental Law in December 1991 in Munich, Germany: see, in particular, International 
Council of Environmental Law and IUCN-Commission on Environmental Law “Law concerning 
the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict” Consultation 13-15 December 
1991 Final Recommendations, cited in Gasser (1995) at 639 n 14. 
216  See, in general, Birnie P, Boyle A and Redgwell C International Law and the Environment 3ed 
(2009) at 207. A proposal on the drafting of a “Fifth Geneva Convention on the protection of the 
environment in time of armed conflict” was indeed discussed at a conference in London in 1992: 
see Gasser (1995) at 639 n 12. While this approach was useful in clarifying issues, the suggested 
solution did not at the time encounter strong support. 
217  Ibid 258. 
218  Art 94(2) of the UN Charter reads: “2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations 
incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the [International] Court [of Justice], the other 
party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make 
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment”. 
219  Such a fear may well exist where judgments are made against a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council. In the Case of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) 1986 ICJ Reports 14, one could possibly attribute 
the failure of the Security Council to act to the fact that Art 94(2) of the UN Charter neither 
mandates the Security Council to enforce judgments nor establishes a procedure whereby such 
judgments relate to a (permanent) member of the Security Council.  
220  Art 46 para 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that the Committee of 
Ministers (the Committee) is responsible for overseeing the execution of the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights. After final judgment, the Committee invites the respondent 
state to report on the specific steps as well as any general measures taken in compliance with 
the state’s legal obligation to abide by the judgment. The Committee is assisted by its own 
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A new convention should furthermore extend its regime of liability to both states 
and individuals, thereby capturing the somewhat elusive accountability of non-state 
actors under international law. While the liability of states should, depending on the 
special circumstances of every case, relate to compensation, repatriation and 
restitution, criminal responsibility of individuals, which is already an established 
feature under some existing international (humanitarian law) instruments, should 
be preserved. Compensation both for damage foreseen or actually caused ought to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
A new convention should ideally provide redress for both individual and group 
claimants for damage caused to the natural environment during armed conflict. 
Redress should be in the form of either restitution or compensation. For the 
purpose of group or individual claims, states need not make a declaration221 to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the proposed court or tribunal, as jurisdiction should be 
compulsory. It is furthermore suggested that, to achieve greater protection of the 
environment in armed conflict, the new convention should expressly demilitarise 
forests, as the latter can under such circumstances absorb the various emissions 
associated with armed conflicts. 
The drafting of a new convention should preferably be a joint exercise 
undertaken by the ICRC and UNEP, as both have an extensive and proven record of 
dedication to secure protection for the environment in armed conflict. The new 
convention may be adopted under the auspices of either the ICRC or UNEP: while 
the former’s ethos of neutrality may well serve to secure greater acceptance by the 
international community,222 the proposed role assigned to the Security Council may 
well point to the latter as the preferred option. 
                                                                                                                                            
secretariat and the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights: see “The role of the Committee of Ministers” available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+Court+works/The+execution+of+judgments/ 
(accessed 14 April 2011). 
221  As provided for expressly by, for example, Art 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, which states: “The 
states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other states accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of 
a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation”. Art 36(3) stipulates that 
such declarations “may be made unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of 
several or certain states, or for a certain time”. Declarations are to be deposited, in terms of Art 
36(4), with the Secretary-General of the UN.  
222  Although states displayed some reservation in the early 1990s for such a “dramatic 
metamorphosis of the lex scripta” and governments were generally reluctant to accept 
significant new obligations in this field, global concern about the natural environment has 
gained considerable momentum in the last decade. It need not be argued that the natural 
environment is under increased threat and this reality may well encourage the international 
community to reconsider its former position on the adoption of a new convention: see, in 
particular, Dinstein (2001) at 549 n 142. 
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The adoption of an entirely new convention is indeed preferable to the mere 
drafting of a (fourth) additional protocol223 to the four Geneva Conventions. A new 
convention would have the additional advantage of allowing errors, omissions or 
supplementary provisions to be augmented in a subsequent protocol – a standard 
practice in international law. Such a course of action would avert the proliferation of 
(additional) protocols or amendment protocols. However, should states fail to ratify 
the new convention, the rules and principles of customary international law, binding 
on the whole community of nations, would be applicable. Evidence224 that damage 
to the natural environment in armed conflict is prohibited under customary 
international law225 is clearly manifest in the fundamental principles of IHL,226 
including even possibly United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/37 of 1992 
which states that the “destruction of the environment not justified by military 
necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing international 
law”.227 It is to be hoped that these proposals will aid the international community 
to take the bold political decisions required to provide adequate and comprehensive 
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